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Abstract 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is internationally recognised as a leading anti-
corruption scheme, which promotes transparency, accountability and good governance of public oil, gas, and 
mining revenues. The paper provides the first rigorous quantitative investigation of the impact of EITI on 
corruption in Zambia. Using a case-comparison approach, called the Synthetic Control Method (SCM), we find 
that the implementation of EITI provoked a significant decrease in corruption in Zambia (with the corruption-
reducing effect of EITI being, though, much stronger at the earlier stages of implementation).  
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1. Introduction 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has emerged in the international 
policy arena as a key measure to curb corruption in the extractive sector. Sovacool et al. (2016) 
explains that the initiative aims to ensure free, full, and independent assessments of how 
extractive companies interact with government. For states to acquire and maintain EITI 
membership, they must enforce contract disclosure, adhere to financial transparency standards 
and audits (also known as reconciliation), and ensure the running of a multi-stakeholder group, 
which provides civil society a platform to keep public officials and companies accountable for 
their activities in this sector.  
In 2016, a surge of interest arose from academic scholars publishing quantitative evaluations 
of the effect of EITI on corruption; for example see Kasekende et al. (2016), Öge (2016), 
Papyrakis et al. (2016) and Sovacool et al. (2016). Whilst these evaluations largely focused on 
providing estimates of the average effect of EITI across member countries, a notable point 
which has emerged from such work is the need to further conduct quantitative research on 
individual member states (as to develop a better understanding of EITI and how to improve it). 
Building on these arguments, we contribute to the existing literature on the effect of EITI on 
corruption by performing the first quantitative case-comparison country analysis on the EITI 
member state of Zambia.  
Zambia is a highly mineral-endowed state, which sits on top of the largest known reserves 
of copper in Africa. It makes a particularly interesting case-study in this research domain given 
that the country has been prominently highlighted within the corruption literature for its 
continued internal battle with political and public corruption. For example, the work of Taylor 
(2006) has highlighted the impeachment of former Presidents regarding such issues. More 
broadly, Zambia makes an interesting case-study, given the endemic corruption and overall 
poor track record in resource management in most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. Notably, a 
study released by the African Union estimated that corruption cost African countries $150 
billion a year. This is more than 6 times the amount the continent receives in aid from developed 
economies (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009). Meanwhile, EITI (2010) identifies Africa as 
a region of specific interest to the initiative given that many countries across the continent face 
considerable governance issues. 
To put things into context, in April 2007, the Zambian government appealed to the World 
Bank to assist them in administering a scoping study (regarding the relevant costs and benefits 
3 
 
 
of EITI participation). The corresponding review, in September 2007, suggested that the 
proposed implementation of EITI would be both feasible and beneficial to the country (World 
Bank, 2007). Following these recommendations, in 2008, the Zambian government announced 
its commitment to implementing EITI and during 2009 became an official EITI candidate. 
Finally, by 2012 (after a successful validation) Zambia was designated a fully compliant 
member of EITI.1 To date, the Zambian EITI (ZETI) national body has published seven EITI 
reports which include reconciliation data. These published reports have gradually expanded 
coverage on financial transactions in the mining, gas and oil sector, with the number of 
reporting companies increasing from 16 to 40 (EITI, 2016). 
In this study, we aim to investigate the hypothesis that the adoption of EITI has reduced the 
prevalence of corruption in Zambia, as measured by two popular measures of corruption – i.e., 
the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the World 
Governance Indicators’ Control of Corruption Index (CCI). To do so, we implement a case-
comparison estimation method, derived from Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et 
al. (2010), called the Synthetic Control Method (SCM). Adoption of this comparative 
methodology, first, offers to mitigate common limitations associated with conventional time-
series case study analysis (such as the need to extrapolate over time) and, second, strengthens 
the selection procedure by choosing a comparison unit to act as a counterfactual to Zambia. 
Furthermore, we also investigate whether the beneficial effects of EITI are concentrated in 
particular stages of its implementation. This builds on the work of Corrigan (2014) and 
Papyrakis et al. (2016), who suggest that the effects of the intervention may occur prior to a 
country obtaining compliant status. For example, Papyrakis et al. (2016) claim that the effects 
of EITI are strongest whilst a country is in its candidate stage (i.e. the initial stage of 
implementation in preparation for compliance validation). We also build upon the only other 
known study, by Etter (2014), to have used SCM to measure the effects of EITI. Our analysis 
extends this earlier work with the inclusion of inference tests to evaluate the significance of 
reported findings and by concentrating attention to a fully compliant member of the EITI 
standard.  
In the next section of the paper we briefly review existing empirical evidence on the EITI-
corruption nexus. Section 3 describes our estimation strategy and data. Section 4 presents the 
                                                          
1 Also see the official EITI standard by the EITI International Secretariat (2016) for further details on the 
requirements and process of joining the EITI.  
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results of our empirical investigation. We find that corruption decreased substantially during 
the earlier stages of EITI implementation (in contrast to the insignificant changes observed in 
the later candidacy and compliance stages). Finally, Section 5 concludes by summarising our 
main findings and offering a critical reflection on the Zambian EITI process. 
 
2. The effect of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative on corruption 
Most recently, a series of cross-country studies have empirically examined the effect of EITI 
on corruption. Conclusions from such works are largely mixed as evident from the varied 
spectrum of results. For example, whilst Sovacool et al. (2016) and Öge (2016) report, on 
average, that EITI has not had a significant effect on corruption, Corrigan (2014) and Papyrakis 
et al. (2016) find a significant corruption-reducing effect (and Kasekende et al., 2016, a 
significant corruption-enhancing effect instead). Conflicting results generated a 
methodological debate, with Kasekende et al. (2016), for example, arguing that other EITI 
studies do not sufficiently control for selection bias. Two points of particular interest have 
emerged from this methodological debate.  
First, several studies claim that the effect of the EITI on corruption may occur prior to a 
country obtaining compliance membership status and that the effect may differ across the 
different stages of implementation. For example, Corrigan (2014) describes that government 
actions at the onset of EITI implementation (when public authorities express their public 
commitment to the scheme) can lead to a significant reduction in corruption. Meanwhile, 
Papyrakis et al. (2016) claim that EITI is more effective in combating corruption at the stage 
of implementation during which countries receive a candidate status – this is because during 
this stage candidate countries must implement a series of important changes, including the 
timely publication of EITI reports and public disclosure of all related financial flows in the 
extractive sector, in order to be designated as fully compliant. Further empirical investigation 
would help clarify how the EITI-corruption nexus might differ across different stages of 
implementation for member states.  
Second, Kasekende et al. (2016) and Papyrakis et al. (2016) have highlighted the need to 
conduct further context-specific investigations (as a means to improve our understanding of 
where and why EITI may or may not work). McCartney (2006) emphasises that by solely 
focusing on average effects, important and insightful effect heterogeneity may remain 
undetected. Isaksson and Ng (2006) also suggest that, from a policymaker’s point of view, a 
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cross-country study does not answer whether the intervention has actually served its purpose 
in a specific context of interest. However, known examples of studies which seek to identify 
the direction or magnitude of the effect of EITI on corruption in national contexts are largely 
limited to a published study by Sovacool and Andrews (2015) and a conference paper by Etter 
(2014).  
Sovacool and Andrews (2015) evaluate the effect of Azerbaijan’s and Liberia’s compliance 
with EITI in 2009, by simply depicting the time-trend of the CCI between the years 2006-2012. 
The authors concluded that whilst trends in corruption improved after compliance in 
Azerbaijan, this was not the case for Liberia. Further contextual analysis by the authors 
suggests that a reduction in political support of the initiative may have caused implementation 
to stall in Liberia (in addition to disputes within the country’s EITI multi-stakeholder group).   
Meanwhile, Etter (2014) applied two different counterfactual approaches, SCM and Entropy 
Balancing, to measure the effect of EITI on corruption in Mali and Peru. Both of these methods 
utilised pre-processing techniques that assign a set of optimised weights to a control group of 
non-EITI countries in order to formulate a counterfactual. The notable difference between these 
methods, and arguable advantage of SCM, is that SCM tests the similarity of the constructed 
weighted control unit across a pre-EITI time period. This helps to distinguish whether 
unobserved differences may be confounding the estimated weightings applied to the control 
units. Etter (2014) concludes that, whilst corruption fell in Peru following the introduction of 
EITI, in Mali corruption increased. His study, though, suffers from methodological limitations 
by only analysing the period prior to the countries becoming compliant, as well as failing to 
measure the statistical significance of the SCM results.  
 
3. Evaluating the effect of EITI on perceptions of corruption in Zambia 
Building on these insights, we employ the SCM approach in order to examine the effect of 
EITI on corruption in Zambia. We pursue this case-comparison methodological approach for 
two reasons. First, SCM mitigates common weaknesses associated with conventional time-
series case study analysis, since it limits the need to extrapolate over time and weakens the 
susceptibility of the analysis to time-varying confounding (Jandoc et al., 2015; Linden and 
Arbor, 2015). Second, SCM prevents the erroneous task of descriptively choosing a 
comparison unit, which, if inappropriately chosen, may confound conclusions. Instead of 
relying on subjective decision-making, SCM employs a data-driven approach to select a 
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comparison with a statistical affinity with Zambia (Abadie et al. 2010). As an additional 
methodological innovation, rather than simply assuming that a single comparison unit exists 
that is sufficiently similar to Zambia, SCM explores whether a weighted combination of 
potential comparison units provides a better fit. Using notation and description adapted largely 
from Abadie et al. (2010), Cavallo et al. (2013), and Galiani and Quistorff (2016), this section 
continues by formally defining the SCM strategy and inference methodology adopted, and 
further describes the data employed in the analysis.  
 
Synthetic Control Method Estimation Strategy   
Let’s start by defining an index in the range {1, …, J+1}, where the first unit corresponds 
to Zambia and consecutive ones to the remaining J are non-EITI countries, which may serve 
as a control unit to Zambia. These control units are also known as ‘donors’ or the ‘donor pool’. 
Furthermore, T represents the total amount of periods (years) observed, so that 𝐘𝑗 is defined as 
the (T × 1) vector of corruption outcomes for unit J. This vector of corruption outcomes may 
also be divided into pre and post EITI vectors, so that 𝐘𝑗 = 𝐘𝑗 ⃐  \𝐘𝑗    . Also, to further disaggregate 
𝐘𝑗, let  𝐘0 represent the (T × J) matrix of corruption outcomes for all donors and 𝐘1 the (T × 1) 
matrix of corruption outcomes for Zambia. Therefore, the pre-EITI corruption outcomes can 
be retrospectively represented by 𝐘1 ⃐    and 𝐘0 ⃐   .  
Next, we define X as a set of k pre-EITI predictors of corruption (Y). Specifically, whilst 
𝐗0 represents the (k × J) matrix of donor predictors, 𝐗1 represents the (k × 1) matrix of 
predictors for Zambia. V is then taken to be a (k × k) variable weighted matrix, indicating the 
relative significance of the predictor variables (X) in determining corruption (Y). The final 
matrix to be defined in this model is defined as W, which is a (J × 1) weighted matrix 
(𝑤2, 𝑤3,…, 𝑤𝑗+1)’ where ∑ 𝑤𝑗
J+1
𝑗=2 = 1 and 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {2, …, J+1}. Note that a weighted average 
of the donors’ corruption outcomes, or more simply put, the ‘synthetic unit’ or ‘synthetic 
Zambia’, can now simply be given by 𝐘0W.  
The purpose of the SCM approach is then to identify the optimal combination of weightings 
in W that minimises the distance √(𝐗1 − 𝐗0𝐖)’𝐕(𝐗1 − 𝐗0𝐖) = ∣∣ 𝐗1-𝐗0𝐖 ∣∣𝐕. For the 
purposes of this analysis, the distance is defined as the root mean squared prediction error 
(RMSPE). To further explain the reasoning behind this method, assume that corruption (Y) is 
affected by both observed (X) and unobserved (U) factors (Y = βX + U). The SCM process 
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searches for weights W that result in similar X values – when this consecutively leads to a 
small absolute value of 𝐘1 ⃐   -𝐘0 ⃐   𝐖, Abadie et al. (2010) argue that this will also imply similar 
values for U.  
In the case that pre-treatment outcome trajectories are well matched, the impact estimate for 
each post-EITI year can simply be taken as the difference between Zambia’s corruption score 
and the synthetic unit’s one. Or more formally: 
?̂?1𝑡 = Y1𝑡 − ∑ 𝑤𝑗Y𝑗𝑡
𝑗≥2
 
However, one limitation (with regards to the conventional method of simply taking the 
differences between the treated unit and the synthetic unit) is that this does not allow for a 
straightforward analysis of varying treatment effects across time. For example, it would be of 
interest to examine if the treatment effect is stronger during different stages of EITI 
implementation. In order to achieve this, the analysis would require to compute the changes in 
differences for each period. For this reason, to standardise the methodology used, our study 
calculates the treatment effects as the average annual change in differences: 
?̂?1𝑡 =
Y1𝑡−𝑡0
𝑡 − 𝑡0
−
∑ 𝑤𝑗Y𝑗𝑡−𝑡0𝑗≥2
𝑡 − 𝑡0
 
 
Method of Inference 
It is important to evaluate whether the differences between the synthetic Zambia and real 
Zambia are statistically significant. However, as explained by Abadie et al. (2015), the use of 
conventional inference techniques applied to regression analysis is inappropriate due to the 
small sample nature of the data. Alternative methods which have been developed to conduct 
inference tests in this domain relate to permutation tests (Cavallo et al., 2013). Here, the same 
SCM approach is simply re-applied to the donor pool to create a distribution of placebo study 
effects (also known as a distribution of ‘in-place’ placebo effects, see Galiani and Quistorff, 
2016). Conceptually, the estimated impact of EITI in Zambia would be undermined if we 
estimate effects of similar magnitudes in countries that are not members. Ando (2015) explains 
that this concept is akin to classical randomisation inference, except that the treatment is not 
randomised. Therefore, the interpretation of this method is informal but nevertheless very 
informative.  
In practice, a p-value is derived from the proportion of non-EITI countries which have an 
estimated effect at least as large as that of the treated units. Using notation from Galiani and 
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Quistorff (2016), when the estimated effect for Zambia is represented by ?̂?1𝑡 and the 
distribution of the corresponding placebos derived from the non-EITI countries is 
?̂?1𝑡
𝑃 ={?̂?𝑗𝑡: 𝐽 ≠ 1}, then the two sided p-value is given by: 
p-value = Pr(|?̂?1𝑡
𝑃 | ≥ |?̂?1𝑡|) = 
∑ 1(|?̂?𝑗𝑡|≥|?̂?1𝑡|𝑗≠1 )
J
 
In addition to the above, two further methods of inference have been proposed by Abadie et 
al. (2010). Specifically, these methods are more considerate of the quality of the 
approximations of the synthetic units in the donor pool. Poorly estimated synthetic units can 
result in overly conservative p-values, because the larger deviation in the estimation error 
underestimates the relative rarity of the treated unit’s effect size (see Galiani and Quistorff, 
2016). For this reason, the second method proposed simply conducts the procedures discussed 
above on a restricted donor pool. This comprises only of donors that can offer a similar pre-
EITI RMSPE as Zambia. Abadie et al. (2010) further proposes a number of parameters by 
which to restrict the donor sample. This includes restricting donors to just those that have a 
RMSPE that is at most twice as large (RS(2)), 5 times as large (RS(5)) or 20 times as large 
(RS(20)) as the treatment unit (although the need to endorse a subjective judgement on an 
appropriate cut-off point poses a clear weakness).  
A further weakness of this inference method is that, for it to be informative, it requires that 
the size of the restricted sample size is sufficient. For example, should one want to obtain a 
confidence level of 5%, the sample must host at least 20 constituents. Mathematically, the 
minimum rank percentage value here is computed as 
1
20
= 5%. Consequently, when restricting 
the sample size of the donor pool, a distinct trade-off is found between improving the fit of the 
donor pool and reducing the level of confidence which can be inferred. Therefore, we only 
report p-values for the restrictions discussed above which still enable the analysis to infer 
confidence at the 5% level or lower.  
The third method suggested by Abadie et al. (2010) mitigates the need to neither restrict the 
donor pool nor choose a subjective cut-off point. To do so, it specifically assumes that the size 
of the deviation between the real and synthetic units during the pre-intervention period is 
informative for assessing the deviation in the treatment period. In order to prevent observing 
overly conservative p-values, this test simply adjusts the estimated effects measured in the 
treatment period against the pre-EITI deviation. Practically, this involves dividing the post-
EITI effect size estimate by the pre-EITI RMSPE. Similar to the first method, p-values are 
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derived from the proportion of the non-EITI countries which have an estimated effect at least 
as large as that of the treated unit (Zambia) (Galiani and Quistorff, 2016).  
To distinguish between these three methods of inference, we refer to the first method 
discussed as the Non-Restricted Donor Sample method (NRDS), the second one as the 
Restricted Sample method (RS(n), where n refers to the cut off parameter), and the third one 
as the Adjusted Non-Restricted Donor Sample method (ANRDS).  
 
Data  
The study period used to investigate the effects of EITI on corruption in Zambia is 
constrained to the years 2002-2014 (max: T=12). The period is selected to maximise the 
availability of control countries and predictor variables for the estimation of synthetic Zambia. 
The pre-EITI period in this analysis is defined as the period 2002-2006, whilst the years 2007-
2014 define the treatment period of interest.  
Specifically, we define 2007, the year of the World Bank Review, as the first intervention 
year by extending arguments derived from Corrigan (2014). Here, it is suggested that the 
government’s initial actions, such as a public expression of commitment to EITI, may have 
signalled a change in the government’s tolerance of corrupt activities. By initiating the scoping 
review through the World Bank, the Zambian government might have wished to provide a 
credible signal about its intentions to reform and implement anti-corruption measures. As a 
result, this may have reduced the prevalence of corrupt activity to the extent that corrupt agents 
sought to protect themselves from future risk of exposure.   
With regards to outcome variables, the study adopts two different annual perception 
measures of corruption, i.e. the CPI and the CCI indices. Transparency International‘s (2011) 
CPI index ranks countries based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. The 
index is scaled from 0 to 10 with higher scores associated with lower levels of corruption. The 
CCI indicator measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. The 
index is scaled from -2.5 to 2.5, also with higher scores corresponding to lower levels of 
corruption (Kaufmann et al., 2009).  
Both indicators are aggregate corruption indices, i.e, they standardise and average the scores 
from many individual sub-indices in order to obtain a single weighted value for each country 
(for a detailed review of the technicalities relating to the weighting procedures for the CPI and 
10 
 
 
CCI, see Rohwer, 2009). We focus on these two indicators, given their extensive used as 
outcome variables in the existing empirical EITI literature to date (which allows for greater 
comparability to previous findings in this domain).  
Figure 1. Perceptions of corruption in Zambia (2002-2014) 
 
A practical issue to bear in mind is that, since 2012, Transparency International changed the 
way of measuring its CPI index (and its scale). For this reason, our analysis is only conducted 
until 2011 on this indicator, since the new CPI index is not comparable to its pre-2012 
equivalent. Figure 1 presents the trends of the CCI and CPI outcome indicators before and after 
2006 (the baseline year). This shows that the index values for both indicators increased since 
2006 (in other words, perceived corruption has decreased since Zambia expressed interest in 
the EITI scheme).  
 
Naturally, little can be said with regards to how corruption would have evolved in the 
absence of the EITI, without adopting strong assumptions to extrapolate over time. Therefore, 
in order to construct a counterfactual (synthetic) Zambia using the SCM, we compile a list of 
predictor variables of corruption (X). The complete list of predictors is presented in Appendix 
1. This list comprises of variables that have been identified as significant determinants of 
corruption (in the existing EITI cross-country empirical literature, as well as the broader 
literature on corruption and its causes) – for some key studies, see Treisman (2000), Jain 
(2001), Ali and Isse (2003), Serra (2006), Ata and Arvas (2011) and Elbahnasawy and Revier 
(2012).  Further to this, and in line with other SCM studies, such as Abadie et al. (2015), Sills 
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et al. (2015) and Ando (2015), we also include the pre-EITI corruption indices as predictor 
variables. It may well be that unobserved characteristics prove highly influential in determining 
the corruption outcome variables (which could, then, drive differences between the synthetic 
and real pre-EITI trajectories in corruption). Therefore, including the pre-intervention outcome 
variable as a predictor helps to limit the sensitivity of the weighting procedure to these 
unobservable factors and ensures a better fitting pre-intervention model. 
A list of the countries constituting each donor pool, according to each outcome indicator, is 
available in Appendix 2. Donors included in the restricted sample inference tests, mentioned 
above, are also indicated in this table. Appendix 3 provides descriptive statistics for the donor 
pools predictor variables, based on which  the Synthetic Zambia is constructed (note, that the 
predictor variables are taken as the average value of each variable during the pre-EITI period, 
2002-2006,  in line with common practice discussed in Abadie et al (2010; 2015). 
 
4. Results 
After deriving a set of weights for the donor pool based on an optimization algorithm, the 
synthetic Zambia is constructed as a weighted average of all donor countries. The individual 
weights derived for each donor country using this optimization tool are reported in Appendix 
2 by outcome indicator.2 
It is customary to assess whether the estimated synthetic unit is an appropriate 
counterfactual to the real Zambia. In order to do so, SCM analyses, such as the ones by Abadie 
et al. (2010) and Ando (2015), visually compare the difference between the pre-treatment 
outcomes of the real unit and the synthetic units. This assesses whether the differences in unit 
predictors (see Appendix 4) and unobserved variables significantly affect the synthetic units 
ability to predict the treated unit over time. Following this method, Figure 2 presents the 
corruption outcome trends over the study period for both Zambia and the Synthetic Zambia. 
When observing the trends in corruption across the outcome indicators until 2006 (CPI – top 
panel; CCI – bottom panel), it is evident that the synthetic units are very similar to Zambia. 
The levels and changes in corruption over this period are almost identical in both outcome 
graphs.  
  
                                                          
2 The optimisation algorithm used in this analysis is available through the Stata SCM command –synth–.See: 
https://web.stanford.edu/~jhain/synthpage.html for further information. 
12 
 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of Zambia and Synthetic Zambia’s trends in corruption 
 
 
Having concluded that the pre-EITI trends are similar, we now review the estimated effects 
of EITI from 2007 onwards. Beginning by simply observing the changes over time in Figure 
2, it is evident from both the CPI and CCI graphs that Zambia’s outcome positively diverges 
from Synthetic Zambia’s values, starting from the World Bank ‘Review stage’ in 2007. This 
positive divergence (signalling a drop in corruption) persists throughout all subsequent stages 
of implementation (i.e. also in 2008 when Zambia officially expressed commitment to the EITI 
scheme – ‘Commit stage’ – in 2009, when it received candidate status – ‘Candidate stage’ – as 
well as since 2011, when it was declared fully compliant – ‘Compliant stage’). For a clearer 
image of the size of the divergence over time (and across different stages of implementation) 
also see the long dashed line in Figure 3. This line depicts the difference, or the gap as Abadie 
et al. (2010) describe it, between Zambia and Synthetic Zambia’s corruption outcomes in each 
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time period. Overall the results suggest that EITI has had a beneficial effect in reducing 
corruption in Zambia.  
Figure 3. ‘In Place’ placebo gaps 
 
 
Table 2 provides the overall (average annual) change in gap size for each outcome indicator 
during the defined treatment (post-EITI) period, as well as the change observed during each 
individual EITI implementation stage. The latter aim to highlight the stages of the EITI process 
that resulted in the largest statistically-significant changes in corruption. In order to infer 
whether these results could have been achieved by chance, we develop a distribution of ‘in 
place’ placebo gaps. A graphical representation of the estimated placebo gaps compared to 
Zambia’s can be seen in Figure 3. Table 2 provides the p-values (statistical significance) for 
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each gap estimate based on the three inference methods that are derived from the placebo gap 
distributions.  
Table 2.  Zambia’s average annual change in gap size 
  
Total 
2007-14† 
Review 
2007 
Commit 
2008 
Candidate 
2009-11 
Compliant 
2012-14 
CPI 
 Gap Size 
(annual) 
0.13 0.11 0.31 0.09 n/a 
NRDS 
P-value  
0.26 0.39 0.83 0.55 n/a 
RS(20) 
P-value  
0.16 0.60 0.12 0.52 n/a 
ANRDS 
P-value  
0.02** 0.05** 0.02** 0.15 n/a 
CCI 
 Gap Size 
(annual) 
0.04 0.20 0.12 -0.02 0.02 
NRDS 
P-value  
0.32 0.10* 0.26 0.71 0.78 
RS(2) 
P-value 
0.50 0.05** 0.10* 0.95 0.95 
ANRDS 
P-value 
0.23 0.04** 0.06* 0.92 0.97 
Note: † CPI results are average annual changes until 2011; *, **correspond to a 10 and 5% level of 
significance. 
The CPI results are the first set of findings presented in Table 2. Here it is shown that the 
0.13 average annual increase in Zambia’s CPI (i.e. fall in corruption) relative to Synthetic 
Zambia for the period 2007-11 is statistically significant at the 5% confidence level according 
to the ANRDS method of inference, but insignificant according to the NRDS and RS(n) 
criteria. In order to further explore possible causes for this initial disagreement between 
inference methods, the CPI graph in Figure 3 is re-examined.  
Figure 3 (CPI graph) shows that some of the synthetic units developed for the donor 
countries do not reproduce the average donor (gap) outcomes well (i.e. the distance between 
the average donor (gap) dotted line and the individual synthetic unit grey lines in the pre-EITI 
period, is large). For example, one synthetic unit starts almost 1.5 index points higher than the 
average donor gap outcome in 2002. Given the poor fit of some of the donor pool synthetic 
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units, it can be argued that perhaps the first method of inference (NRDS) is not particularly 
suitable and that the donor sample may need to be restricted or adjusted. However, the CPI 
model did not host many placebo effects where individual synthetic units provided a good fit 
for Zambia. Therefore, the strictest parameter of those previously discussed, that could be 
applied, is the loosest restriction of RS(20). The concern now lies with the issue that the RS(n) 
method may be generating an overly conservative estimate of the size of the Zambian gap given 
the wide breadth of estimation error this restriction parameter allows. This, therefore, offers 
some explanation as to why the CPI’s RS(20) p-values may disagree with the p-value obtained 
from the ANRDS method. 
Given these limitations regarding the use of the RS(n) and NRDS methods, the ANRDS 
inference results are deemed the most reliable for inferring the significance of the CPI-model 
effects (with the 0.13% average annual increase in Zambia’s CPI index, during 2007-14, being 
statistically significant at the 5% level). Further analysis of the estimated effects observed for 
individual stages of implementation shows that the relative increases during the review (+0.31) 
and commitment (+0.11) years are also significant at the 5% level (however, the average annual 
change during the later candidate stage (+0.09) is insignificant according to all three inference 
tests).  
The second set of results presented in Table 2 refer to the CCI model. For the CCI index, 
the inference tests unanimously agree that the total average annual change in differences (+0.04 
index points) is statistically insignificant. However, further investigation of the estimated 
changes during the individual stages of implementation reveals that there are statistically 
significant reductions in corruption during the report and commitment years (in line with the 
earlier findings of the CPI models). Here, a relative increase of 0.20 index points is observed 
during the earlier review stage (and is statistically significant according to all inference 
methods; significance at the 10% level according to NRDS and at the 5% level when using our  
preferred RS(n) and ANRDS p-values). At the same time, the RS(n) and ANRDS tests indicate 
that the relative increase of 0.12 points during the commitment period is significant at the 10% 
level. The average annual changes in differences during the later candidacy and compliance 
phases are almost zero (-0.02 and 0.02) and insignificant.  
Overall, it is interesting to observe that the most significant and largest relative changes in 
both sets of results are witnessed prior to either the candidacy or compliance stage. This is in 
line with theory presented in Corrigan (2014) which suggests that initial actions, that credibly 
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signal future implementation of EITI, are likely to dissuade corrupt activities (with corrupt 
actors reacting proactively to the incoming changes enforced by EITI). In this scenario, it is 
possible that EITI’s largest effects are, in effect, observed much before the full compliance 
stage. These results also contradict previous findings from Papyrakis et al. (2016), who find 
that the candidacy stage has the most pronounced corruption-reducing effect.  
It may also be the case that practical challenges stifled progress at later stages of 
implementation. For example, Zambia’s EITI reconciliation reports express concerns about 
independent organisations (acting on behalf of ZEITI) having no legal authority to enforce 
compliance at the company level (BDO, 2015). Whilst the international EITI secretariat 
enables member countries to join without enacting its standards into law, the lack of legal 
authority can hamper the complete auditing of the sector and create systemic corruption 
loopholes. In addition, there is very limited information (see Zambia EITI, 2015) highlighting 
how discrepancies identified in reconciliation reports are resolved – a more transparent follow-
up procedure with publically available documentation could increase scrutiny of such cases 
and further deter corruption. Last, the role of multi-stakeholder group meetings can be 
strengthened (in the anti-corruption arena as well as in other areas) by standardising the 
reporting of issues raised at these events and setting a formal follow-up process that addresses 
them.   
 
5. Conclusion 
Since its inception, the EITI has been widely recognised by the international community as 
a major anti-corruption scheme that promotes transparency, accountability and good 
governance in the extractive sector. Yet, whilst several recent studies have offered quantitative 
empirical evidence on its effect on corruption, their investigation has been largely confined to 
cross-country analysis with little attention given to country-specific effects and particularities. 
Our study contributes to this empirical literature by concentrating attention to the specific 
corruption-reducing effect of EITI for Zambia. In addition, we also examine whether the effect 
of EITI is concentrated in particular stages of engagement with the EITI process. Our empirical 
analysis suggests that EITI reduced corruption in Zambia, especially during the earlier stages 
of implementation. In later phases of implementation (candidacy and compliance stages), the 
EITI effect, though, is statistically insignificant and/or of a small magnitude.  
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This may be associated with practical challenges that possibly hamper EITI’s corruption-
reducing effect at later stages of implementation. For example, there is currently no 
independent legal authority in Zambia that can enforce compliance at the company level and, 
hence, ensure a complete auditing of the extractive sector. In addition, there is also no formal 
follow-up procedure that tackles discrepancies identified in reconciliation reports and takes 
forward recommendations from multi-stakeholder group meetings. In that respect, the EITI 
secretariat could incentivise compliant countries to take further steps in increasing transparency 
in the sector by introducing a tiered membership system (e.g. one that rewards more proactive 
states with more advanced membership status).  
Our study is a first step in exploring the EITI-corruption nexus in the Zambian context. 
Zambia was only designated a fully compliant EITI member in 2012 and some of the scheme’s 
corruption-reducing effect may only appear with some time lag. Future research could, hence, 
revisit our analysis and examine whether the effect of the intervention may change after years 
of longer experience with the initiative. Another direction of future research would involve 
replicating our SCM analysis in other contexts, as a means to shed additional light on the 
specific experience of individual EITI members with the scheme.    
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Table of predictor variables used to estimate Synthetic Zambia 
Variable Name Variable Description Data Source 
Freedom of the Press 
 
Degree of print, broadcast, and digital media freedom. Index Range: 0-
100 (Lower scores given to nations with a freer press). 
 
 
Freedom House (2016) 
Log of GDP per capita 
 
Log of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita, PPP (constant 2011 
international US$).  
 
World Bank (2016) 
GDP Growth 
 
Annual GDP growth %.  
 
World Bank (2016) 
Urbanization 
 
Urban population (% of total). 
 
World Bank (2016) 
Labour Participation 
 
Labour force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15+). 
 
World Bank (2016) 
Openness to foreign 
trade 
 
Trade (% of GDP).  
 
World Bank (2016) 
Log of population 
 
Log of population size, total.  
 
World Bank (2016) 
Natural Resource Rents 
 
Total Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP).  
 
World Bank (2016) 
Inequality 
 
Gini coefficient of income inequality. Index Range: between 0 and 100 
(larger values correspond to more unequal income distributions). 
 
Solt (2016) 
Bureaucratic quality 
 
Institutional strength and quality of government services. Index Range: 
0-4 (higher scores given to nations with higher institutional strength and 
quality).  
 
PRS Group (2016) 
Democratic 
Accountability 
 
Index of how responsive a government is to its people. Index Range: 0-
6 (higher scores are given to nations considered more democratically 
accountable). 
 
 
PRS Group (2016) 
Ethnic Tensions 
 
Degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, nationality, or 
language divisions. Index Range: 0-6 (higher scores given to nations 
where tensions are considered low). 
 
 
PRS Group (2016) 
Religious Tensions 
 
Measure of religious tensions arising from the domination of governance 
by a single religious group Index Range: 0-6 (higher scores given to 
nations where tensions are considered low). 
 
PRS Group (2016) 
Government Stability 
 
Ability of a government to stay in office. Index Range: 0-12 (higher 
scores given to nations with governments deemed more stable). 
 
PRS Group (2016) 
Internal Conflict 
 
Level of political violence in a country. Index Range: 0-12 (higher 
scores given to nations with less conflict). 
 
PRS Group (2016) 
External Conflict 
 
Risk of foreign action, such as cross-border conflict and war. Index 
Range: 0-12 (higher scores given to nations with less conflict). 
 
PRS Group (2016) 
Law and Order 
 
Strength and impartiality of the legal system and the degree of popular 
observance of the law. Index Range: 0-6 (higher scores given to nations 
with more impartial legal systems with lower crime rates). 
 
 
PRS Group (2016) 
Military in Politics 
 
Degree of military participation in politics. Index Range: 0-6 (lower 
scores given to nations with less military participate in politics).  
 
 
PRS Group (2016) 
Pre-EITI Outcome 
Variables 
 
CPI or CCI index, dependent on the outcome indicator being modelled.  
 
Transparency International (2016) 
/ World Bank (2016) 
Note: Predictors variables are averages (2002-2006). 
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Appendix 2. List of donor pool countries and weights by corruption outcome indicator 
CPI CCI 
Country Weight Country Weight Country Weight Country Weight 
Australia 0* Malaysia 0* Armenia 0.004* Lithuania 0 
Austria 0 Mexico 0* Australia 0 Luxembourg 0 
Bangladesh 0 Moldova 0 Austria 0* Malaysia 0* 
Belarus 0 Morocco 0 Bangladesh 0 Malta 0 
Belgium 0 Netherlands 0* Belarus 0* Mexico 0* 
Bolivia 0 New Zealand 0* Belgium 0 Moldova 0 
Brazil 0 Nicaragua 0.355* Bolivia 0 Morocco 0 
Bulgaria 0 Pakistan 0 Brazil 0 Netherlands 0* 
Canada 0 Panama 0 Bulgaria 0 New Zealand 0* 
Chile 0* Paraguay 0 Canada 0 Nicaragua 0 
China 0.032* Poland 0 Chile 0 Pakistan 0 
Costa Rica 0 Portugal 0 China 0 Panama 0 
Croatia 0 Romania 0 Costa Rica 0 Paraguay 0 
Czech Republic 0 Russia 0.006* Croatia 0 Poland 0* 
Denmark 0 Singapore 0* Czech Republic 0* Portugal 0 
Ecuador 0* 
Slovak 
Republic 
0 Denmark 0* Romania 0* 
Egypt 0* Slovenia 0* Ecuador 0.421 Russia 0 
El Salvador 0 South Africa 0 Egypt 0 Singapore 0 
Estonia 0 Spain 0 El Salvador 0 
Slovak 
Republic 
0 
Finland 0* Sri Lanka 0 Estonia 0 Slovenia 0 
France 0 Sweden 0* Finland 0* South Africa 0* 
Greece 0* Switzerland 0 France 0 Spain 0 
Hungary 0* Thailand 0* Greece 0 Sri Lanka 0* 
Iceland 0* Tunisia 0 Hungary 0* Sweden 0* 
India 0 Turkey 0.054 Iceland 0 Switzerland 0* 
Ireland 0 Uganda 0* India 0.141 Thailand 0 
Israel 0 Uruguay 0.161 Iran 0 Tunisia 0 
Italy 0 Venezuela 0* Ireland 0 Turkey 0.139 
Japan 0 Vietnam 0* Israel 0 Uganda 0* 
Jordan 0 Zimbabwe 0.239 Italy 0* Uruguay 0 
Kenya 0*   Japan 0 Venezuela 0* 
Korea Rep. 0.154*   Jordan 0 Vietnam 0 
Latvia 0   Kenya 0 Zimbabwe 0* 
Lithuania 0   Korea Rep. 0.296   
Luxembourg 0   Latvia 0   
Note: * indicates that the country was included in the restricted donor pool sample during inference tests referred 
to as RS(n).  
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Appendix 3. Descriptive statistics (Zambia and donor pools) 
 
Zambia 
CPI Donor Pool CCI Donor Pool 
Variable Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
Log of population 16.27 16.53 12.56 20.99 16.47 12.56 20.99 
Log of GDP per capita 7.78 9.56 7.03 11.41 9.55 7.03 11.41 
Freedom of the press 63.8 37.45 8 90 38.17 8 90 
Inequality 50.43 36.22 22.07 22.07 36.18 22.07 57.52 
Labour Participation 79.92 60.59 40.2 86.7 60.23 40.2 86.7 
Urbanization 36.19 64.98 12.25 100 65.42 12.25 100 
Openness to foreign trade 63.61 89.34 21.16 430.35 89.64 21.16 430.35 
GDP Growth 6.72 4.47 -16.99 18.28 4.58 -16.99 18.28 
Natural Resource Rents 11.39 4.68 0 43.54 5.03 0 46.06 
Religious tensions 4.6 4.83 1 6 4.79 1 6 
Military in politics 5 4.45 0 6 4.47 0 6 
Law and order 4 4.20 0.5 6 4.19 0.5 6 
Internal conflict 9.44 9.83 2.96 12 9.81 2.96 12 
Government stability 6.28 8.67 5.04 11.5 8.66 5.04 11.5 
External Conflict 10.05 10.39 6.13 12 10.34 6.13 12 
Ethnic tensions 5 4.21 1 6 4.25 1 6 
Democratic Acc. 4.25 4.68 1 6 4.65 1 6 
Bureaucratic quality 1 2.66 1 4 2.63 1 4 
CPI 2.58 5.05 1.2 9.7 - - - 
CCI -0.77 - - - 0.40 -1.48 2.55 
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Appendix 4. Comparison of predictor variable balance between  
Zambia and Synthetic Zambia 
Variable Zambia 
CPI Synthetic 
Zambia 
CCI Synthetic 
Zambia 
Log of population 16.27 16.38 17.42 
Log of GDP per capita 7.78 8.17 8.22 
Freedom of the press 63.8 60.36 47.88 
Inequality 50.43 46.21 46.24 
Labor 79.92 69.52 68.88 
Urbanization 36.19 49.32 38.31 
Openness to foreign trade 63.61 64.13 49.98 
GDP Growth 6.72 1.18 5.53 
Natural Resource Rents 11.39 10.70 11.23 
Religious tensions 4.6 4.20 3.68 
Military in politics 5 2.43 2.63 
Law and order 4 2.88 2.93 
Internal conflict 9.44 8.25 8.02 
Government stability 6.28 7.45 7.29 
External Conflict 10.05 9.37 10.08 
Ethnic tensions 5 4.15 3.00 
Democratic Acc. 4.25 4.06 4.19 
Bureaucratic quality 1 1.46 2.13 
Average CPI 2.58 2.58 - 
Average CCI -0.77 - -0.77 
 
 
